USA v. Michael Torres by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-5-2020 
USA v. Michael Torres 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Michael Torres" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 563. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/563 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 19-2940 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL E. TORRES, 
   Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-17-cr-00392-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
April 23, 2020 
 
Before: PORTER, RENDELL and FISHER  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  June 5, 2020) 
____________ 
 
Heidi R. Freese, Federal Public Defender 
Frederick W. Ulrich 
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 
100 Chestnut Street 
Suite 306 
Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
Counsel for Appellant Michael Torres 
 2 
 
 
David J. Freed, United States Attorney 
Carlo D. Marchioli,  
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754 
220 Federal Building and Courthouse 
Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 
Counsel for Appellee United States of America 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 After a bench trial, the District Court found Michael 
Torres guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court imposed 
a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because 
it determined that Torres had three qualifying felony 
convictions. 
Torres raises two arguments on appeal. First, he 
contends that the District Court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress the firearm. Second, Torres argues that his prior 
federal drug conspiracy conviction does not qualify as an 
ACCA predicate offense because it encompasses his other two 
substantive ACCA predicates. We will affirm. The firearm was 
discovered during a valid investigative stop. And we will join 
our sister circuits in holding that a drug conspiracy conviction 
counts as an ACCA predicate offense, so long as it was distinct 
in time from the underlying substantive offenses. 
I 
Officer Steven Pickel of the City of York Police 
Department patrols York’s west end. The west end is a high-
crime area known for violent crime, such as homicides, 
shootings, drug incidents, and aggravated assaults. York police 
“regularly” investigate reports of “shots fired” in the west end, 
“especially in the evening.” App. 48. 
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Around 6:00 p.m. on October 31, 2017, Officer Pickel 
drove his patrol car along the border between the west end and 
York College’s campus. A man in a parked vehicle flagged the 
officer down. The man pointed to the only pedestrian on a 
bridge. The man said that the pedestrian was “wearing a black 
jacket with his hood up, blue jeans, and black sneakers” and 
that he pulled out a gun and fired it twice into an old factory 
building across the street. App. 48. The man was “adamant” 
about this description.1 Id. The pedestrian was later identified 
as Torres. 
Instead of asking for the man’s name or recording his 
license plate number, Officer Pickel immediately radioed for 
backup and followed Torres in his patrol car. Officer Pickel 
feared that Torres posed a potential danger to others. And he 
knew from his training and experience that any delay would 
make it very difficult to locate Torres. 
As other officers arrived, Officer Pickel activated his 
emergency lights and exited his patrol car. Based on the 
information that Torres had discharged a firearm, Officer 
Pickel drew his service pistol and ordered Torres to “get to the 
ground.” App. 71. Torres complied, and two other officers, 
including Officer Jonathan Hatterer, approached Torres. 
Officer Hatterer knelt and asked Torres if he had a firearm. 
According to Officer Hatterer, Torres said that he did and then 
indicated that it was in his right pocket. Officer Hatterer 
handcuffed Torres while another officer retrieved the firearm. 
A grand jury indicted Torres and charged him with 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm as a 
convicted felon. Torres pleaded not guilty and moved to 
suppress the firearm. The District Court denied the motion. It 
determined that the officers found the gun in Torres’s 
possession during an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), rather than during an arrest. It further 
concluded that the stop was constitutional because Officer 
Pickel had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. 
The District Court then held a bench trial and found 
Torres guilty. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) 
 
1 Officer Pickel believed that his body camera captured the 
encounter, but it malfunctioned. 
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advised that Torres qualified for enhanced sentencing under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e) of the ACCA because he had at least three 
prior convictions for serious drug offenses. The PSR identified 
two state drug possession convictions, one federal drug 
distribution conspiracy conviction, and a felony conviction for 
attempted homicide. Torres objected to the enhancement, 
arguing that, because the state drug possession offenses were 
part of the federal drug distribution conspiracy, the drug 
conspiracy conviction should not be counted as a separate 
predicate offense. The District Court denied Torres’s 
objection, applied the enhancement, and sentenced Torres to 
the mandatory-minimum sentence: 180 months’ 
imprisonment. Torres timely appealed. 
II2 
Torres argues that the officers violated the Fourth 
Amendment when they seized him, so the firearm should have 
been suppressed. He maintains that the seizure amounted to an 
arrest that lacked probable cause. Alternatively, he contends 
that even if the seizure were an investigatory stop, Officer 
Pickel lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. We disagree. 
Officer Pickel conducted a valid investigatory stop to ensure 
officer safety and the safety of the community. And the stop 
was supported by reasonable suspicion because Officer Pickel 
received a reliable tip. 
A 
“Generally, for a seizure [of a person] to be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, it must be effectuated with a 
warrant based on probable cause.” United States v. Robertson, 
305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967)). But a police officer may arrest 
a person in a public place without a warrant if the officer 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a). For a motion to suppress, we review factual findings 
for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 
Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2010). We review 
challenges to the application of an ACCA enhancement de 
novo. United States v. Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
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possesses probable cause to believe the person committed a 
felony. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 342 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421 
(1976)). Or, “an officer may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory 
stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). 
The Supreme Court has not established a bright-line 
rule to distinguish a warrantless arrest from an investigatory 
stop. But the “reasonableness of the intrusion is the 
touchstone” of our analysis. Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 
F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1985)). The Supreme Court “ha[s] 
emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes 
to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed 
to effectuate those purposes.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 
(citations omitted). By these standards, Torres was subjected 
to an investigatory stop. 
To begin, “[t]here is no per se rule that pointing guns at 
people, or handcuffing them, constitutes an arrest.” Baker, 50 
F.3d at 1193 (collecting cases); see also United States v. 
Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 1995) (surrounding a 
suspect “with weapons ready, and even drawn, does not 
constitute an arrest per se”). Terry recognized that when 
officers are investigating a suspect who the officers reasonably 
believe “is armed and presently dangerous to the officer[s] or 
to others, it would . . . be clearly unreasonable to deny the 
officer[s] the power to take necessary measures to determine 
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm.” 392 U.S. at 24. 
Torres’s case resembles the factual scenario we 
encountered in United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 
2010). In Johnson, a witness called a 911 dispatcher to report 
that she saw two men struggling before hearing a gunshot. Id. 
at 445. After the gunshot, the witness watched a white taxicab 
depart the scene. Id. A short time later, police spotted a white 
taxicab in the vicinity and stopped it. Id. Officers surrounded 
the taxicab with guns drawn. Id. at 445–46. They ordered the 
occupants out of the car and handcuffed the defendant and the 
taxi driver so that they could “safely clear the vehicle and 
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gather information about the [reported] shooting.” Id. at 446. 
Officers then discovered a handgun in plain view in the 
backseat of the car. Id. Under these facts, we held that the 
officers conducted an investigatory stop, not an arrest. Id. at 
448. 
So, too, here. Officer Pickel received a tip that Torres, 
just moments before, had discharged a firearm in a high-crime 
area. A brief encounter with police ensued. Only thirty-five 
seconds elapsed between the time when Officer Pickel ordered 
Torres to stop and when police secured Torres’s firearm.3 
Thus, the seizure was an investigatory stop—not an arrest. 
B 
Because Torres was subjected to an investigatory stop, 
we next ask whether the stop was supported by reasonable 
suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. It was. 
Reasonable suspicion exists if an officer can “articulate 
more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch 
of criminal activity.” Id. at 124 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “Reasonable suspicion requires only a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity” based on 
“the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Green, 897 
F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations, quotation marks, and 
alteration omitted). “We afford significant deference to a law 
enforcement officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion.” 
United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 104 (3d Cir. 2018). 
Because Officer Pickel acted on an informant’s tip, we 
must decide whether the tip was reliable. United States v. 
Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2008). In doing so, we 
consider whether: (1) the information was provided to the 
police in person, allowing an officer to assess directly the 
informant’s credibility; (2) the informant could be held 
responsible if his allegations are untrue; (3) the information 
would not be available to the ordinary observer; (4) the 
 
3 Torres tries to distinguish Johnson, arguing that Officer 
Pickel did not have as much detailed information as the officers 
in Johnson. But this goes to whether Officer Pickel had 
reasonable suspicion—not whether the encounter amounted to 
an arrest.  
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informant had recently witnessed the alleged criminal activity 
at issue; and (5) the informant’s information accurately 
predicted future activity. United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 
249–50 (3d Cir. 2006). 
These factors are not exhaustive, and “a tip need not 
bear all of the indicia [of reliability]—or even any particular 
indicium—to supply reasonable suspicion.” Torres, 534 F.3d 
at 213 (citation omitted). “Other factors can bolster what would 
otherwise be an insufficient tip,” including “the presence of a 
suspect in a high[-]crime area[.]” Id. at 211 (alteration and 
citation omitted). At bottom, we must discern whether the tip 
had “sufficient indicia of reliability . . . for us to conclude that 
the officers possessed an objectively reasonable suspicion” to 
justify the stop. Brown, 448 F.3d at 250 (quoting United States 
v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
Based on the Brown factors, the tip was reliable. First, 
Officer Pickel interacted with the tipster face-to-face and thus 
could assess his credibility. The tipster waved down Officer 
Pickel and adamantly explained what he had personally 
witnessed. Second, Officer Pickel would likely be able to hold 
the man accountable if his allegation were untrue. Although 
Officer Pickel did not know the tipster’s name or his car’s 
license plate number, he did know what the man looked like 
and the make of the car that he drove. Third, the tipster had just 
witnessed the alleged criminal activity. See Navarette v. 
California, 572 U.S. 393, 400 (2014) (observing that a 
statement “made under the stress of excitement caused by a 
startling event . . . weigh[s] in favor of the [tipster’s] veracity”). 
The fact that Torres was in a high-crime area also favors 
reliability. See Torres, 534 F.3d at 211. Shootings were 
reported “regularly” in the west end. App. 48. Considering all 
the circumstances, and “given . . . the danger posed by an 
armed criminal, we think that if [Officer Pickel] had done 
nothing and continued on [his] way after receiving the 
informant’s tip, [he] would have been remiss.” United States v. 
Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2000). In short, Officer 
Pickel had reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the 
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circumstances. See Green, 897 F.3d at 183. Thus, Torres’s 
Fourth Amendment argument fails.4 
III 
Torres next argues that he is not subject to the ACCA’s 
enhanced mandatory-minimum sentence under § 924(e). 
Specifically, he maintains that, because his federal drug 
conspiracy conviction encompassed his two state drug 
possession convictions, the federal drug conspiracy conviction 
cannot count as one of the necessary predicate offenses. We 
disagree. 
Under the ACCA, a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum 
sentence applies to any defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) after receiving three or more convictions “for a 
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on 
occasions different from one another[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) 
(emphasis added). To decide whether convictions were 
committed on different occasions, we apply the separate 
episode test and analyze whether the offenses were “distinct in 
time.” United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir. 
1989) (per curiam). 
We have held that three robberies carried out in four 
days were separate episodes because they “occurred on 
separate occasions” “and targeted different geographic 
locations and victims[.]” United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 
228–29 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
In Blair, we cited with approval the decisions of two other 
Courts of Appeals, which held that robbery offenses were 
 
4 Torres faults Officer Pickel for failing to corroborate the tip 
before pursuing him. But we will not “second-guess the 
officer[’s] decision to pursue the suspect immediately. The 
officer[] knew [that] the suspect was still in the vicinity[ ] 
and[,] had [the officer] stalled for more lengthy questioning of 
the informant, the armed suspect could have escaped 
detection.” United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 355 (3d 
Cir. 2000). Torres also attacks the reliability of the tip because 
he claims it came from an anonymous source. The identity of 
the source is irrelevant because the tip bore sufficient indicia 
of reliability under the totality of circumstances. United States 
v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2008) 
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separate episodes even when committed less than an hour 
apart. Id. at 229 (citing United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 
692 (11th Cir. 1998), and United States v. Brady, 988 F.2d 664, 
668–70 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc)). 
We have not decided whether a felony conspiracy 
conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense when it 
encompasses a defendant’s other substantive predicate 
convictions. Our sister circuits have unanimously concluded 
that it does. For example, in United States v. Melbie, the Eighth 
Circuit held that a drug possession offense that occurred 
“during the period” of a drug conspiracy offense counted as a 
separate ACCA predicate because “the possession offense was 
a discrete episode in a series of events.” 751 F.3d 586, 587 (8th 
Cir. 2014). The Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have adopted 
Melbie’s approach. See United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 
1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); United States v. 
Pham, 872 F.3d 799, 802–03 (6th Cir. 2017). 
We agree and hold that a conspiracy offense counts as 
an ACCA predicate offense even when it covers other 
substantive ACCA predicate offenses, so long as the 
conspiracy offense is a “separate episode” that was distinct in 
time from the other offenses. See Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d at 73–
74. A defendant’s participation in a conspiracy may be broader 
than his underlying ACCA predicate convictions. Thus, the 
relevant inquiry is whether a defendant’s underlying 
convictions were distinct episodes in the course of conduct 
constituting his participation in the drug conspiracy. 
We have no difficulty concluding that Torres’s drug 
possession offenses were “distinct in time” from his drug 
conspiracy offense. Torres’s two state drug possession 
offenses occurred in July 2004 and July 2005, respectively. Yet 
his involvement in the federal drug conspiracy continued 
between July 2004 and February 2006. As Torres admitted 
while pleading guilty to the conspiracy charge, he committed 
numerous other overt acts: packing and dispensing drugs and 
handling money; attempting homicide to recover stolen drugs; 
contacting co-conspirators and the ringleader on numerous 
occasions; and exercising responsibility over large amounts of 
crack cocaine. Thus, Torres’s participation in the conspiracy 
was broader than his two drug possession offenses. And rather 
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than withdraw from the conspiracy, he returned to it, even after 
his state drug convictions. 
* * * 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
